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INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY: CONFUSION PREVAILS-California
v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 107 S. Ct. 1083 (1987).
The courts have failed to give the Indian tribes of the United States
a straight answer on the boundaries of Indian sovereignty. The pre-
dominant issue before the courts is how to balance the disparate inter-
ests of the federal government, the states, and the tribes themselves.
The courts have battled to balance the interests of each party involved
and they have lost. The battle was lost because the courts have not
developed a consistent standard that is fair to any of the parties
involved.
The most recent Indian law case before the Supreme Court, Califor-
nia v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, I involved the rights of states
to regulate gambling on federally recognized Indian reservations. The
Court ruled in Cabazon that state regulation of tribal gambling opera-
tions was not allowed.2 This Note examines the Court's decision, pro-
poses a more consistent method for application of Public Law 280, and
suggests adoption of a new test for Indian law decisions. The balanc-
ing test currently used by the Court, which weighs state interests in
jurisdiction almost equally against Indian interests, should no longer
be used in conjunction with traditional Indian preemption analysis.
Instead, Indian preemption analysis should continue to favor tribal
interests over state intrusion. Preserving the presumption of Indian
sovereignty in federal Indian law will make future opinions more pre-
dictable and will contribute to the Indian tribes' efforts to become self-
sufficient.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Rise and Fall of Tribal Sovereignty
Indian tribes occupy a unique position in the United States. They
are sovereign nations with inherent powers of self-government.3 Yet,
this tribal sovereignty is dependent on, and subordinate to, the federal
government.4 The Supreme Court's interpretation of tribal sover-
eignty has gradually changed over the years from a strict rule prohibit-
1. 107 S. Ct. 1083 (1987).
2. Id. at 1095.
3. See F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 231-42 (1982 ed.). The late Felix
S. Cohen served with the Department of the Interior and was renowned as an expert in Indian
law.




ing state intervention to a more lenient standard that weighs state,
tribal, and federal interests.
1. The Early Cases: "The Wall"
The early Indian law decisions erected an insurmountable wall
between the Indian reservations and the governments of the states.
The federal government was the only legislative body with power over
the Indians under any circumstances.5 The states were entirely
excluded from dealing with the tribes unless Congress expressly dele-
gated the power to them. This view lasted almost fifty years.6
The Court's attitude towards the Indian tribes' legal status was first
clearly expressed in 1831 by Chief Justice John Marshall. Marshall's
opinions are the basis of jurisdictional law that prohibits the exercise
of state power over Indian affairs. In the landmark Cherokee case,7
Justice Marshall described a tribe as "a distinct political society sepa-
rated from others, capable of managing its own affairs and governing
itself. 8 Tribal sovereignty was not complete, however, in that a tribe
could not be considered a "foreign state" within the meaning of article
III, section 2 of the Constitution.9 The key phrase that emerged from
this case and which remains a cornerstone of Indian law is Marshall's
characterization of Indian tribes as "domestic dependent nations."'
The next influential Indian decision was Worcester v. Georgia, "
which clarified the "territorial test" that was implied by the Cherokee
decisions. Justice Marshall again characterized the Indian nations as
independent political communities with distinct boundaries within
which their authority was exclusive and the laws of Georgia could
have no effect. 12
5. The Constitution enables the President to make treaties, with the consent of the Senate,
and Congress is granted the power to "regulate Commerce .. . with the Indian Tribes." U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; art. II, § 2, cl. 2. State laws, on the other hand, had no force in Indian
territory. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832).
6. Essentially, "the wall" lasted from Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831),
to United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1882).
7. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). Georgia gave up land claims in
reliance upon a federal promise to extinguish Indian title to lands within Georgia, but as time
passed the state grew tired of waiting for the federal government to act. Instead, Georgia passed
a series of laws that extended state law over the Cherokee territory, invalidated all Cherokee
laws, and made it illegal for the Cherokees to act as a government.
8. Id. at 16.
9. Id. at 17.
10. Id.
11. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). Two missionaries appealed their arrest for violating a state
law requiring non-Indians residing in Indian territory to obtain a license from the state governor.
12. Id. at 557, 561.
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2. The Change: "The Infringement Test"
In the late 1800's, the courts began to encroach upon "the wall" by
formulating tests which would give the states power over the Indians
in certain cases. The Court first opened the door to an eventual bal-
ancing of competing Indian and state interests by its rulings in United
States v. McBratney 13 and Draper v. United States. 4 In these criminal
cases, the Court ruled that Congress could not have intended the total
exclusion of state power over completely non-Indian crimes that just
happened to take place in Indian country.15
The long-term effects of these two decisions have been enormous. 6
Indian law is much more complex as a result. 7 Instead of only deter-
mining the location of the event in question, a court now also has to
identify the subject matter and the identity of the parties involved in
the case.' 8
This change was more clearly articulated nearly fifty years later in a
civil case. In Williams v. Lee, 19 the Court stated that "absent gov-
erning Acts of Congress, the question has always been whether the
state action infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their
own laws and be governed by them."2
With this case, the infringement test was born.2' Instead of denying
the states jurisdiction outright, the courts first determined whether
there was an encroachment upon Indian interests.22 If an Indian
interest was jeopardized, the states were barred from acting as they
had been in the past.23 If an interest of the tribes was not being
invaded, however, the states could act.24 The purely geographical
13. 104 U.S. 621 (1882).
14. 164 U.S. 240 (1896).
15. Id. at 245-47; McBratney, 104 U.S. at 623-24.
16. See W. CANBY, AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL, 102-03 (1981).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. 358 U.S. 217 (1959). The Court ruled that state courts had no jurisdiction over a civil
claim by a non-Indian against an Indian involving a transaction that occurred on an Indian
reservation. The actual outcome of the case was consistent with prior holdings in Indian law.
20. Id. at 220 (emphasis added).
21. See, eg., Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of Yakima Indian Nation, 439
U.S. 463, 502 (1979); Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 386-87 (1976); Kennerly v. District
Court, 400 U.S. 423 (1971).
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"territorial test" was destroyed.25 The infringement test was still
strict, but it was no longer absolute.2 6
3. The Unpredictable 1970"s: "Preemption Analysis"
There was tremendous activity in Indian law during the 1970's.27
For the first time the states gained a real foothold of significant
authority.28 The Supreme Court adjusted its test for deciding Indian
law cases, moving from infringement to preemption analysis. 29 In pre-
emption analysis, state jurisdiction is preempted if it conflicts or is
incompatible with federal and tribal interests as reflected in federal
law.30 The dramatic effect of this move was to reduce Indian sover-
eignty to a "backdrop" against which applicable treaties and federal
statutes were to be measured.3'
Traditional preemption analysis allows Congress to oust all or some
state authority in areas where states are able to legislate absent federal
authority.3 2 Indian preemption analysis differs significantly from the
traditional federal preemption doctrine. 33 Under the traditional doc-
trine, Courts are reluctant to allow federal preemption of state law
25. See. e.g.. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959); New York ex rel. Ray v. Martin, 326 U.S.
496 (1946); Arizona ex rel. Merrill v. Turtle, 413 F.2d 683 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
1003 (1970).
26. See, e.g., Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60 (1962) (the Court suggested that
state jurisdiction could be extended to Indians as well as non-Indians in Indian country if there
was no direct interference with tribal government).
27. The Supreme Court issued more Indian decisions than in any other comparable period in
the history of the United States. Pelcyger, Justices and Indians: Back to Basics, 62 OR. L. REV.
29, 29 (1983).
28. "[T]he trend has been away from the idea of inherent Indian sovereignty as a bar to state
jurisdiction and toward reliance on federal preemption." McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax
Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973); see also Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones. 411 U.S. 145
(1973).
29. The phrase "preemption analysis" was introduced into Indian law in McClanahan. 411
U.S. at 172. The Court held that a state has the power to apply its laws unless preempted by
applicable treaties and federal statutes. Id.
30. See id.; Warren Trading Post v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685. 688 (1965).
31. McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 172. The doctrine of Indian sovereignty was no longer the
answer to disputes by itself. The courts relied on the idea of federal preemption instead, and
looked to Indian sovereignty as another factor to be considered along with federal statutes and
treaties.
32. See, e.g., Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978) (the Court struck down a
state law regulating oil tankers on Puget Sound); City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal,
Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973) (local ordinance curbing airport noise was invalidated by the court).
See generally Note, Preemption as a Preferential Ground: A New Canon of Construction. 12 STAN.
L. Rt-V. 208 (1959).
33. See F. COHEN, supra note 3, at 270-75.
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absent clear congressional intent."4 In contrast, courts frequently
resolve preemption claims involving Indian tribes in favor of the pre-
emption of state law.35 In Indian law, the federal act that is the basis
of the preemption is often extremely general in nature. 36 In examining
"infringements" on tribal sovereignty, courts have broadly construed
the interests of the tribe.37 The result has been a heavy presumption
against the intrusion of state law onto reservations.38 A primary rea-
son for this distinction is the historical recognition of Indian tribes as
distinct political sovereigns.39
Due to the importance of the federal government in every area of
Indian law, preemption could be interpreted to mean that whatever
interferes with the broad and implicit goal of Indian self-government is
an infringement that is preempted by federal law. The Supreme
Court, however, did not adopt this view.4" Instead, the Court
attempted to place boundaries on its analysis.41 In Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe,42 the Court imposed new limitations on tri-
bal power.4 3 Justice Rehnquist wrote that tribes could not exercise
powers that were either surrendered by treaty, prohibited by federal
statute, or inconsistent with the status of domestic dependent
nations.' It was this new and largely undefined third category,
"inconsistency with [tribal] status,"4 5 that made many later decisions
unpredictable.46
34. Note, Confusion in the Land of Indian Sovereignty: The Supreme Court Takes a Detour,
25 ARIz. L. REv. 1059, 1063 (1983).
35. Id.; F. COHEN, supra note 3, at 270-75.
36. Since Indian preemption analysis apparently requires no specific legislative expression,
decisions have left it doubtful whether the Court has formulated one test or two. Indian
preemption analysis can be viewed as a more liberal restatement of "infringement." Barsh, Is
There Any Indian "Law" Left? A Review of the Supreme Court's 1982 Term, 59 WASH. L. REV.
863, 866-67 (1984).
37. See, eg., White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980) (the Court relied
on the federal policy of promoting tribal self-sufficiency and economic development); see also
Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 152 (1982) (quoting White Mountain Apache
Tribe).
38. See, e.g., White Mountain Apache Tribe, 448 U.S. at 143-44; see also GETCHES &
WILKINSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 335 (1986).
39. The distinction also explains why there has been little cross-citation between Indian
preemption cases and other lines of preemption theory.
40. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 208.
44. Id. at 206-08.
45. Id. at 208.
46. Compare United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978) (tribe's power to punish its own
members was not inconsistent with its dependent status), with Montana v. United States, 450
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4. The 1980's: The Growing Power of the State
Over the last few years the proliferation of important Indian law
cases has continued.47 Much of the gray area in Indian law in the
1980's has resulted from jurisdictional disputes involving non-Indi-
ans.a8 Preemption analysis still exists, but now it includes a balancing
test that puts greater emphasis on state interests than any earlier deci-
sions.4 9 The important difference is that for the first time state intru-
sion might be permitted even when only Indian interests are
involved. 0 It is recognized that Indian tribes retain "attributes of sov-
ereignty"5 but the Court's opinions now focus on the question of pre-
emption rather than tribal sovereignty.5"
The Court's new focus is illustrated by Washington v. Confederated
Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation.53 Despite the absence of
express congressional consent, the Court held that the state of Wash-
ington could require tribal smokeshops on reservations to collect state
sales tax from their non-Indian customers. 4 The state's interest in
collecting sales tax from the non-Indians was deemed sufficient to
override the Indians' economic interest in selling less expensive ciga-
rettes on the Indian reservation.55
The changing character of Indian law was also dramatically illus-
trated in Rice v. Rehner.56 The decision ultimately rested on what the
Court determined to be "traditional" in Indian life.57 In allowing the
U.S. 544 (1981) (tribal regulation of non-Indian hunting and fishing on reservation land owned
by non-Indians was held inconsistent with tribal status).
47. See Barsh, supra note 36, at 864.
48. See, e.g., Central Mach. Co. v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 448 U.S. 160 (1980) (Indian
trader statutes, as federal law, preempt the application of state tax laws to tractor sales by non-
Indians on the reservation); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation,
447 U.S. 134 (1980) (state taxation permitted of non-Indians purchasing cigarettes on
reservations).
49. See, e.g., New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 333 (1983); White
Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 144 (1980); Confederated Tribes of Colville
Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. at 153-54.
50. Canby, supra note 22, at 12.
51. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 107 S. Ct. 1083, 1087 (1987).
52. In White Mountain Apache Tribe, the Court held that there were two independent but
related barriers to state jurisdiction. 448 U.S. at 142. Regulation by the state could be preempted
by federal law or found to infringe unlawfully on the right of the tribes to govern themselves.
However, the courts have been relying on the question of preemption rather than tribal
sovereignty. See, e.g., Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973) (regulation by the
state was preempted by federal law, but a backdrop of tribal sovereignty was not mentioned).
53. 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
54. Id. at 159.
55. Id. at 154.
56. 463 U.S. 713 (1983).
57. Id. at 722.
Indian Sovereignty
state to impose its tax on liquor consumption, the Court reasoned that
such consumption was not a "traditional" Indian activity. 8 The
Court also asserted that Congress had always intended joint regulation
of liquor on the reservations by Indians and the states. 59
The power of the state to control Indian gambling has been the
topic of considerable debate in recent years.6" Generally, the federal
courts have held that a state cannot regulate gambling on the reserva-
tions,61 although there have been exceptions to this rule.62 Federal
statutes have often been the deciding factor between permitting or
prohibiting a state from intervening in Indian gambling activities.63
B. Federal Statutes Granting State Jurisdiction
In general, states lack jurisdiction over Indian reservations until it is
granted by the federal government."4 Two federal statutes have an
important role in this scheme and in the Cabazon decision. Public
Law 28065 transfers federal jurisdiction to the states, and the Organ-
ized Crime Control Act66 converts violations of state gambling laws
into federal violations.
L Public Law 280
Public Law 280 ("PL 280")67 extends state criminal jurisdiction and
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See Comment, Indian Sovereignty Versus Oklahoma's Gambling Laws, 20 TULSA L.J. 605
(1985).
61. See, eg., Barona Group of Capitan Grande Band of Mission Indians v. Duffy, 694 F.2d
1185 (9th Cir. 1982), cert denied, 461 U.S. 929 (1983); Seminole Tribe v. Butterworth, 658 F.2d
310 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981), cerL denied, 455 U.S. 1020 (1982); Langley v. Ryder, 602 F. Supp.
335 (W.D. La. 1985).
62. See, e.g., United States v. Dakota, 796 F.2d 186 (6th Cir. 1986); United States v. Farris,
624 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1111 (1981); Penobscot Nation v. Stilphen,
461 A.2d 478 (Me. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 923 (1984).
63. See, eg., Seminole Tribe v. Butterworth, 658 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981) (P.L. 280),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020 (1982); United States v. Farris, 624 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1980) (OCCA),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1111 (1981).
64. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 170-71 (1973) (quoting U.S.
DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 845 (1958)).
65. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162; 25
U.S.C. §§ 1321-1326; 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1982)).
66. 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1982).
67. Criminal jurisdiction is covered in 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a) (1982), and provides:
Each of the States . . .shall have jurisdiction over offenses committed by or against
Indians in the areas of Indian country listed.., to the same extent that such State ... has
jurisdiction over offenses committed elsewhere within the State... and the criminal laws of
such State... shall have the same force and effect within such Indian country as they have
elsewhere within the State.
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limited civil jurisdiction over Indian tribes in six specified states.6" PL
280 also provides that any other state could assume such jurisdiction
by statute or state constitutional amendment.69 Tribal consent to state
jurisdiction is necessary since the passage of the Indian Civil Rights
Act of 1968.70
At the time PL 280 was enacted, its primary aim was to address
lawlessness on the reservations.7' Consequently, the provisions for
state criminal jurisdiction were the main focus. 72 Very little legislative
history exists on the rationale for granting civil jurisdiction to the
states.7 3 It is likely that the provision for civil jurisdiction was added
as an afterthought, a result of the assimilationist policies of the
1950'S.
74
The Supreme Court first interpreted PL 280 in Bryan v. Itasca
County.7 5 The Court ruled that when Indian parties were involved,
states were only granted civil jurisdiction over private civil suits
between Indians and Indians, and between Indians and non-Indians.76
The Court reasoned that tribal governments would be destroyed if
they were subject to the full spectrum of state and county civil regula-
tions.7 7 Based on the division drawn in Bryan between the separate
criminal and civil sections of PL 280, a distinction was made in later
cases between state laws that were civil-regulatory in nature and those
Civil jurisdiction is covered in 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a) (1982), and provides:
Each of the States listed in the following table shall have jurisdiction over civil causes of
action between Indians or to which Indians are parties which arise in the areas of Indian
country listed ... to the same extent that such State has jurisdiction over other civil causes
of action, and those civil laws of such State that are of general application to private persons
or private property shall have the same force and effect within such Indian country as they
have elsewhere within the State.
68. The initial states were Alaska, California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin.
18 U.S.C. § 1162(a) (1982); 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a) (1982).
69. Under this provision there has been total or partial assumption of jurisdiction by Arizona,
Florida, Idaho, Iowa, Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, Utah, and Washington. F. COHEN,
supra note 3, at 362-63 n.125.
70. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1322, 1326 (1982).
71. Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Limits of State Jurisdiction Over Reservation Indians. 22
UCLA L. REV. 535, 541 (1975).
72. See Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 380 (1976).
73. Id. at 381; Goldberg, supra note 71, at 542.
74. Federal policy in the 1950's was aimed at integrating the Indians into white society. See
Goldberg, supra note 71, at 543.
75. 426 U.S. 373 (1976). The case was decided during a period in which federal policy had
switched to Indian self-determination. See Goldberg, supra note 71, at 550.
76. Bryan, 426 U.S. at 385.
77. Id. at 388.
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that were criminal-prohibitory.78 States were granted jurisdiction over
crimes that were classified by the courts as criminal-prohibitory, but
they could not enforce state laws on the reservation that were civil-
regulatory.79 A state law is criminal-prohibitory if it involves activi-
ties that the state determines are too dangerous, unhealthy, or other-
wise detrimental to the general welfare of its citizens.80 The
"shorthand test" developed by the Court is that the law is criminal-
prohibitory if the state finds that the activities in question are against
public policy.8"
2. The Organized Crime Control Act
The Organized Crime Control Act ("OCCA")82 makes specific vio-
lations of state and local gambling laws violations of federal law. Its
application on Indian reservations, like PL 280, is often held to depend
on whether a specified activity is criminal-prohibitory in nature or
civil-regulatory in nature.83
The Ninth and Sixth Circuits came to opposite conclusions on the
requirements for application of OCCA. The Ninth Circuit held in
United States v. Farris84 that OCCA gave the state of Washington its
power to regulate gambling on an Indian reservation because the Indi-
ans' gambling activities were against Washington's public policy." Its
holding effectively found that the tests for PL 280 and OCCA were
coextensive. On the other hand, in United States v. Dakota, 8 6 the Sixth
78. See Barona Group of Capitan Grande Band of Mission Indians v. Duffy, 694 F.2d 1185,
1188 (9th Cir. 1982), cerL denied, 461 U.S. 929 (1983).
79. Id.
80. Oneida Tribe of Indians v. Wisconsin, 518 F. Supp. 712, 720 (w.D. Wis. 1981).
81. See, eg., Seminole Tribe v. Butterworth, 658 F.2d 310, 314-15 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981)
(gambling laws not against public policy, so classified as civil-regulatory and unenforceable on
the tribal reservation), cerL denied, 455 U.S. 1020 (1982); Oneida Tribe of Indians v. Wisconsin,
518 F. Supp. 712, 718-19 (W.D. Wis. 1981) (bingo not against public policy, making laws civil-
regulatory and unenforceable on the reservation).
82. OCCA, 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1982), provides in pertinent part:
(a) Whoever conducts, finances, manages, supervises, directs, or owns all or part of an
illegal gambling business shall be fined not more that $20,000 or imprisoned not more than
five years, or both.
(b) As used in this section-
(1) illegal gambling business means a gambling business which-
(i) is a violation of the law of a State or political subdivision in which it is conducted ....
(Emphasis added).
83. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians v. Riverside County, 783 F.2d 900, 903 (9th Cir. 1986),
aff'd sub nom. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Inidans, 107 S. Ct. 1083 (1987); Barona,
694 F.2d at 1190.
84. 624 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1111 (1981).
85. Id. at 895-96.
86. 796 F.2d 186 (6th Cir. 1986).
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Circuit held that the tests for PL 280 and OCCA were not coexten-
sive.87 In Dakota, Indian gambling did not have to be against public
policy to be in violation of OCCA.88 All that is necessary, the Dakota
Court held, is a finding that a tribal activity is in "violation of the law
of a state."' 9 It was the court's view that the exercise of OCCA is an
exercise of federal, not state, law, so there is no danger of interfering
with tribal sovereignty by enforcing it.9°
C. Federal Policy
The federal government has a trust relationship with the Indians9'
that originates in the Constitution. 9 The Constitution gives Congress
the exclusive power to regulate Indian affairs.93 The relationship
between the federal government and the Indians is not just contrac-
tual, with each side capable of watching out for its own interests. Indi-
ans are in a state of dependency and federal protection is considered
necessary. 94
The protection of the tribes and their members is the principle pol-
icy underlying virtually all of Indian law. 95 Federal policy regarding
this trust relationship has varied over the years from assimilation to
termination to self-determination.96 The goal has always been Indian
self-sufficiency. 97 Only the methods used to achieve self-sufficiency
have varied.98
Current federal policy is to encourage self-government and eco-
87. Id. at 187-88.
88. Id. at 188-89.
89. Id. at 187.
90. Id.
91. See, e.g., St. Paul Intertribal Hous. Bd. v Reynolds, 564 F. Supp. 1408, 1413-14 (D.
Minn. 1983).
92. "Congress is authorized to regulate Commerce... with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONsT.
art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (Indian Commerce Clause). This is the only express grant of federal power over
Indians.
93. Id.
94. See Pelcyger, supra note 27, at 46.
95. Id. at 45.
96. See F. COHEN, supra note 3, at 127-206 for a discussion on the history of federal policy.
97. The government's emphasis has varied from tribal self-sufficiency to individual self-
sufficiency. See generally id; GETCHES & WILKINSON, supra note 38, at 33-160.
98. During the periods of allotment and assimilation (1871-1928) and termination
(1945-1961), the government tried to assimilate the Indians into white culture by encouraging
them to sell surplus reservation land and by attempting to terminate the federal-tribal trust
relationship. During the 1930's and early 1940's the focus was on reorganizing the tribal
governments and making them stronger. Since the 1960's, federal policy has been to encourage
tribal self-government and economic independence. See generally F. COHEN, supra note 3, at
127-206; GETCHES & WILKINSON, supra note 38, at 33-160.
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nomic self-sufficiency on the Indian reservations.99 President Reagan
reiterated the government's stance in his 1983 policy statement:
"[R]esponsibilities and resources should be restored to the govern-
ments which are closest to the people served. This philosophy applies
not only to State and local governments but also to federally recog-
nized ... tribes."' t
Federal policy is also reflected in recent legislative action. A federal
bill, the Indian Gambling Control Act,' 1 has been introduced in Con-
gress in an attempt to address the problem of insufficient supervision
over Indian gambling activities.° 2 The bill recognizes that tribal gam-
bling activities are a legitimate means of generating revenues, and that
the activities help promote the federal goal of economic development
and tribal self-sufficiency. 10 3  The Indian Gambling Control Act
would also establish federal standards and regulations for Indian gam-
bling activities."° The bill would allow gambling on reservations to
continue if conducted by tribal ordinance and approved by the Secre-
tary of the Interior. t0 5
II. CALIFORNIA v. CABAZON BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
State jurisdiction of Indian gambling was denied in California v.
Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, '0 6 but it is difficult to pinpoint with
any precision the theoretical basis of the opinion. The case holding is
in line with federal policy and Indian law precedent, but it is also tai-
99. E.g., White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143 (1980) (there is "a firm
federal policy of promoting tribal self-sufficiency and economic development"); Washington v.
Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 155 (1980) (federal policy is to
foster tribal self-government); accord Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 138 n.5
(1982); see also 116 CONG. REc. 23,258 (1970) (statement by President Nixon on Indian Policy).
100. President Reagan, Statement on Indian Policy, 19 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 98, 98
(Jan. 24, 1983). There has been some dissent within the Reagan Administration, but this express
policy goal has been overriding. For example, the Justice Department proposed an addition to
the United States Criminal Code that would have given the states control of Indian gambling.
The Secretary of the Interior struck down this move since it was inconsistent with the President's
policy statements. See DeDominicis, Betting on Indian Rights, 3 CAL. LAW. 29, 30 (1983).
101. H.R. 4566, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (microfiche at Y 1.4/6:98-(556)). The newest
version of this bill is H.R. 1920, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (microfiche at Y 1.4/6:99-(145)).
The two versions of the bill are virtually identical. An Indian Gaming Control Act was also
introduced in the Senate on April 4, 1985. S. 902, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (microfiche at Y
1.4/1:99-(83)). The principle difference between the House bill and the Senate bill is that the
Senate bill provides for the creation of Indian-controlled Gaming Commissions to supervise
Indian gambling enterprises. S. 902, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 11 (1985).
102. See Comment, supra note 60, at 631.
103. H.R. 4566, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(5) (1983) (microfiche at Y 1.4/6:98-(556)).
104. Id. § 3.
105. Id. § 6.
106. 107 S. Ct. 1083 (1987).
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lored to the specific fact pattern. 10 7
A. The Facts
The Cabazon Band and Morongo Band are federally recognized
Indian tribes residing on reservations in California. 108 Both tribes
operate bingo games for profit on their reservations.'o 9 In addition, the
Cabazon tribe conducts card parlor games for profit." 0 The bingo
activities are regulated by federally approved tribal ordinances."'
Both the card and bingo games are open to the public, and they are
played mainly by non-Indians." 2 Jackpots for bingo exceed $250.1"
These gambling enterprises would violate both local and state ordi-
nances if they were not on Indian reservations.' 14 The State of Cali-
fornia tried to enforce its regulations under both PL 280 and
OCCA. 115 The state asserted that its regulations were "prohibitory"
in nature and therefore applicable under PL 280, or in the alternative
that Congress had authorized an assertion of state power in the area of
gambling through OCCA." 6 Even if Congress had not consented to
state regulation of gambling, California claimed that it was still
allowed to enforce its laws on the reservation because of the important
state interest involved." 7 California does allow some forms of gam-
bling, such as the lottery and bingo games that are operated by chari-
ties,"l8 but the state feared that completely unregulated, high-stakes
gambling on the reservation could lead to an influx of organized crime
which could then spill over into the rest of the state." 9
The gambling enterprises were the tribes' sole source of revenue and
principle source of employment. 120 Because the state and county laws
in dispute were not expressly permitted by Congress, the Indians
107. Id. at 1086-87 (stating case facts).






114. Bingo is not completely prohibited in California, but it can only be operated by certain
charities. Profits must be kept in separate accounts and used for charitable purposes, and prizes
must be under $250 per game. CAL. PENAL CODE § 326.5 (West Supp. 1987). Card games are
prohibited by a local ordinance. Cabazon, 107 S. Ct. at 1086.
115. Cabazon, 107 S. Ct. at 1087.
116. Id. at 1088, 1090.
117. Id. at 1094.
118. Id. at 1089.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1093.
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asserted that the state should not be allowed to enforce its laws on the
reservations. 121
The tribes sued Riverside County in federal district court for a
declaratory judgment that the county lacked the authority to apply its
ordinances inside the reservation.122 The state intervened.123 The dis-
trict court granted the tribe's motion for summary judgment on the
grounds that neither the state nor the county had any authority to
enforce its gambling laws within the reservation.124 The Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.12 The state and the county
appealed, and the Supreme Court postponed jurisdiction to a hearing
on the merits. 126
B. Holding and Rationale
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice White, held that
neither the state nor the county had any authority to enforce its gam-
bling laws on the Indian reservation. 127 The Court has repeatedly held
that state laws may be applied on Indian reservations if Congress has
expressly consented. 128 In this case, however, the Court found that
Congress had not consented to an assertion of state power either
through PL 280 or OCCA. 29 The Court ruled that since the gam-
bling laws were not against public policy, they were civil-regulatory in
nature and unenforceable through PL 280.130 It declined to rule on
OCCA's coverage.13
The Court then applied preemption analysis, using a balancing test
to make the final determination of whether state interests should over-
ride federal and Indian interests. 132 The Court found that under a
balancing test, the state's fear of organized crime developing did not
outweigh the Indians' economic interests. 133
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices O'Connor and Scalia, filed a dis-
sent stating that a state may enforce its gambling laws until Congress
121. Id. at 1091.
122. Id. at 1086-87.
123. Id. at 1087.
124. Id.
125. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians v. Riverside County, 783 F.2d 900 (9th Cir. 1986),
aff'd sub nom. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 107 S. Ct. 1083 (1987).
126. Cabazon, 107 S. Ct. at 1087.
127. Id. at 1095.
128. Id. at 1087.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1089.
131. Id. at 1091.
132. Id. at 1091-95.
133. Id. at 1095.
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exempts Indian gambling from state law and subjects it to federal
supervision. 134  He was reluctant to dismiss the state's interest in
reducing the growth of organized crime as readily as the majority.135
III. ANALYSIS
California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians 36 brings together
most of the current jurisdictional theories in Indian law.' 37 The deci-
sion can be viewed as a declaration that states will not be allowed to
regulate on Indian reservations absent specific conditions.'3  The
opinion offers no assurance, however, that state regulation will not be
expanded in future cases with slightly different facts. 139  These pro-
positions must be examined in light of current federal policy and tradi-
tional Indian law.
The outcome in Cabazon supports Indian self-government, and in
many respects the Court's reasoning was based on traditional Indian
law.' 4° First, the decision did take federal policy on Indian sover-
eignty into consideration. 4 Second, in accordance with traditional
rules of construction in Indian law,' 42 ambiguous statutes were con-
strued in favor of the Indians. 13 Finally, the Court seems to have
made an attempt to draw a line between unassailable Indian interests
and permissible state intrusion. 44
Nevertheless, there are numerous problems with the Court's opin-
ion. The Court does not squarely address the increasing power of the
state to intrude into Indian affairs and its possibly detrimental
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1097.
136. Id. at 1083.
137. These theories are tribal sovereignty; federal preemption analysis; balancing of state,
tribal and federal interests; and the statutory civil-regulatory/criminal-prohibitory and public
policy tests.
138. Cabazon, 107 S. Ct. at 1089-94.
139. Id.
140. For example, the Court does mention the need to consider "notions of Indian
sovereignty." Id. at 1092. This is something the Court has neglected to do in many recent cases.
See, e.g., Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713 (1983); Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145
(1973).
141. Cabazon, 107 S. Ct. at 1092-93.
142. "[S]tatutes passed for the benefit of dependent Indian tribes or communities are to be
liberally construed, doubtful expressions being resolved in favor of the Indians." Alaska Pac.
Fisheries Co. v. United States, 248 U.S. 78, 89 (1918).
143. Cabazon, 107 S. Ct. at 1087.
144. Id. at 1094-95.
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effects.' 45 Nor does the Court address the inconsistent pattern of its
opinions in recent years.' 46 Therefore, the future direction of the
Court is still unclear. To eliminate this problem, the Court could
tighten the test for application of PL 280, and rid preemption analysis
of the current balancing test. These developments would clarify
Indian law and reflect federal Indian policy.
A. The Importance of Congressional Consent
The federal courts have the responsibility of interpreting federal
laws.' 4 7 This is accomplished by taking legislative intent and federal
policy into account in making decisions.148 However, the courts' appli-
cation of PL 280 and OCCA often fails in this regard.
L OCCA's Scope Is Limited
The theories used in prior decisions to deny the application of
OCCA are that gambling is not against public policy14 9 so the gam-
bling laws are not criminal-prohibitory in nature, and secondly that,
because OCCA is a federal law, the states do not have the power to
enforce it. 150 The Cabazon Court declined to rule on the first the-
ory.' 5 ' Instead, it noted that OCCA's status as a federal law is the
very reason the states should not make arrests that, in the absence of
OCCA, they could not make. 5 For the same reason, the states
should not assume that they are supposed to play a part in enforcing
this federal law.' 53 California was trying to enforce its regulations
through the back door by using a federal statute. 154 Instead, the states
145. The Court only states that there is not "an inflexible per se rule precluding state
jurisdiction over tribes and tribal members in the absence of express congressional consent." Id.
at 1091.
146. For example, the Court abandoned the analysis used in Washington v. Confederated
Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980), when deciding Montana v. United
States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981). Two weeks later the Court's decision in Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache
Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982), returned to the Colville analysis and ignored its reasoning in
Montana. See Pelcyger, supra note 27, at 31-32.
147. See, e.g., Hajo v. Kleppe, 420 F. Supp. 1110 (D.D.C. 1976) (court's job is to interpret
statutes), aff'd sub nom. Harjo v. Andrus, 581 F.2d 949 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
148. See, eg., Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (Congress formulates
policies and the courts enforce them).
149. See, e.g., Barona Group of Capitan Grande Band of Mission Indians v. Duffy, 694 F.2d
1185, 1190 (9th Cir. 1982) (gambling not against public policy, so OCCA provisions could not be
enforced on the reservation), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 929 (1983).
150. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 107 S. Ct. 1083, 1090-91 (1987).
151. Id. at 1091.




must still leave enforcement of a federal law to federal officials, even
though the regulations covered by OCCA are originally state stat-
utes.'55 Consequently, if the second theory of recognizing OCCA as a
federal law is adhered to, the first theory is not even relevant.
Cabazon has made at least one thing clearer. Conduct which cannot
be punished under a state law cannot be ruled a violation of that same
state law through a different mechanism.156 Because of the Cabazon
decision, OCCA should not be relied upon as a basis for state jurisdic-
tion in Indian gambling cases. 157
2. The Overly Discretionary Application of PL 280
The Supreme Court has reduced the test for application of PL 280
to a very flexible "shorthand test"-whether or not the stated activity
is against public policy. 158 One of the many weaknesses of this "short-
hand test" is that the actions of the state government determine if an
activity is against public policy.'59 A conflict of interest occurs
between a state's desire to regulate certain Indian activities and its
responsibility to avoid infringing on Indian self-government by defer-
ing to federal Indian policy. The result of the "test" is that if an activ-
ity falls outside the bounds of desired public policy, then all the
principles supporting Indian sovereignty are too easily pushed aside
and state jurisdiction is allowed to apply. A more uniform application
of federal statutes could be achieved if their use depended upon federal
findings rather than individual state policies.
This highly discretionary standard makes future application of PL
280 very tenuous. For example, the Cabazon Court ruled in favor of
the Indians partly because the state's fear of organized crime was only
speculative. 160 The decision might have been different if the Court had
found that California prohibited gambling throughout the state. In
that case, the Court could have used this as evidence that gambling
was against public policy in California. The Court could then have
reclassified the law as prohibitory, allowing the state to apply its laws
on the reservations. Such a decision would allow the state to termi-
155. Id. at 1090.
156. Id. at 1090-91; see also Comment, supra note 60, at 625.
157. In United States v. Farris, 624 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. IIl1
(1981), like Cabazon. Washington permitted a limited amount of gambling, and there was no
indication of organized crime on the reservation. Nevertheless, gambling was held to be contrary
to Washington's public policy, and OCCA could be enforced on the reservation. The Cabazon
decision appears to overrule this case.
158. Cabazon, 107 S. Ct. at 1088.
159. See, e.g., id. at 1088-89.
160. Id. at 1094.
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nate the tribes' only source of revenue, an action which would be
directly contrary to federal policy.16
In ruling on whether the gambling regulations should apply to the
reservations through PL 280, the Cabazon Court did concede that a
case can be made for classifying the gambling laws as prohibitory.'62
It was enough for the Court, however, that the gambling laws had
been ruled regulatory in a prior California decision.' 63 The Court was
able to avoid fully analyzing whether the state gambling laws were
regulatory or prohibitory by finding a rational basis for the lower
court's decision."6 Unfortunately, while the Court's procedure was
not incorrect, it did not contribute to any further understanding of the
regulatory-prohibitory test.
B. A Balancing Test Threatens Indian Preemption Analysis
By leaving the balancing test between Indian and state interests
intact, the Cabazon decision did not effectively stop the trend toward
increasing state intrusion.'65 Exactly how much importance is
attached to state interests has become an increasingly murky subject in
161. During oral argument, counsel for the state claimed, contrary to the state's earlier
position, that the tribes are one of the charitable organizations allowed to sponsor bingo games
under the statute. Therefore, the Court was not certain whether the state intended to abolish the
Indian gambling operations, or only require the tribes to conform to all the statute's
requirements. Id. at 1086 n.3.
162. The Court uses the decisions in United States v. Marcyes, 557 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir. 1977),
and United States v. Farris, 624 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1111 (1981), to
illustrate that the lower courts have had no trouble making the distinction between regulatory
and prohibitory laws, when instead it should rely on the cases as examples of how discretionary
the standard really is. In Marcyes, Washington permitted certain fireworks to be sold in the
state, and wanted restrictions placed on the fireworks sold on the reservation. The relevant
statute in the case was the Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C § 13 (1982), made applicable to
Indian reservations by 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1982), which also relies on the regulatory/prohibitory
distinction for its application on Indian reservations. The statutes regulating the Indian firework
sales were considered prohibitory because the firework sales interfered with the state's attempts
to protect its citizens' general welfare. As a result of the statute's classification as prohibitory,
the Court allowed state regulation of the firework sales. The Court also found it significant that
the fireworks statutes were not primarily licensing laws. These findings could easily be applied to
gambling laws, and the Cabazon court leaves the door open to this ruling in the future.
163. Cabazon, 107 S. Ct. at 1089 (citing Barona Group of Capitan Grande Band of Mission
Indians v. Duffy, 694 F.2d 1185 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 929 (1983)).
164. Id.
165. If federal, tribal, and state interests are balanced against each other, without the
historically strong presumption in favor of the tribes, then states stand a better chance of
prevailing than they did previously. This result is demonstrated by cases such as Washington v.
Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980), and Rice v. Rehner,
463 U.S. 713 (1983).
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Indian law.' 6 6  As a result, the strong presumption against state
encroachment is receding, and Indian tribes can no longer be sure that
the states will not interfere with the tribes' attempts to strengthen their
struggling economies.' 67  In short, a balancing test that allows for
increasing degrees of state intrusion goes against precedent, federal
policy, and the preservation of Indian culture.
1. Problems with a Balancing Test in Indian Law
As preemption analysis exists now, the Supreme Court has effec-
tively collapsed the doctrines of preemption, infringement, and non-
Indian interests into a single balancing test 68 that is closer to the
traditional non-Indian preemption doctrine 69  than conventional
Indian preemption analysis.' 7 ° Traditional preemption analysis is
inadequate, however, because of the increased emphasis placed on
state interests under a balancing test. This focus on state interests is
inappropriate here in light of historical notions of Indian sovereignty.
But the use of a balancing test was the effect in Cabazon when the
Court stated that "[s]tate jurisdiction is pre-empted ... if it interferes
or is incompatible with federal and tribal interest reflected in federal
law, unless the state interests at stake are sufficient to justify the asser-
tion of state authority."' 71 The additional "state interests" exception
coupled with a balancing test takes preemption one step too far, to the
point that tribal interests are becoming secondary. 172
Justice Stevens' dissent demonstrates the extreme direction Indian
law could turn if the presumption in favor of the tribes is weakened.
166. See, e.g., California State Bd. of Equalization v. Chemehuevi Indian Tribe, 474 U.S. 9
(1985) (per curiam) (state cigarette tax applicable to non-Indian purchasers); Ramah Navajo
School Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832 (1982) (state tax on construction of reservation
schools by a non-Indian company preempted by federal regulation).
167. See, e.g., Moapa Band of Paiute Indians v. United States Dep't of Interior, 747 F.2d 563
(9th Cir. 1984) (tribe enjoined from running houses of prostitution on tribal land in Nevada);
United States v. Marcyes, 557 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir. 1977) (state prohibition on the sale of
fireworks on reservations upheld); Penobscot Nation v. Stilphen, 461 A.2d 478 (Me. 1983) (state
ban on beano games upheld).
168. The test is described as a particularized inquiry into the interests at stake. See, e.g.,
Ramah Navajo School Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832, 837 (1982); White Mountain
Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 145 (1980).
169. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
170. See Note, supra note 34, at 1064.
171. Cabazon, 107 S. Ct. at 1092 (emphasis added).
172. In Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 177
(1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring and dissenting), Justice Rehnquist wrote in a separate opinion
that there was no need for the Court to balance the state and tribal interests, as the question is
one of congressional intent. Balancing of interests is not the appropriate test, because it is the
very balancing which has been reserved for Congress.
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His statement that state laws may be enforced on reservations until
Congress exempts the Indian activity from state law 173 is the exact
opposite of traditional Indian law analysis. Stevens' policy would
allow state laws to apply whenever Congress has not expressly
exempted a specific area instead of requiring express congressional
consent to an assertion of state power.
In practice, the Supreme Court has indicated that the state's interest
must have some regulatory significance related to public welfare, 74
but this does not on its face appear to be a very difficult standard to
meet. Unless the federal courts focus on federal policy and the history
of Indian law in their analysis, the diverse interests of the state, Indi-
ans, and the federal government remain too flexible. Enough ambigu-
ity is left to enable the courts to manipulate the various parties'
interests so as to arrive at almost any result.175
A desire for the flexibility to fashion solutions to each individual
case appears to be behind the Court's use of the balancing test. 176 The
problem is that, historically, Indian law has always needed to address
the overriding issue of tribal sovereignty. This need is what makes
Indian law unique-and unsuitable for a balancing of interests analy-
sis. Judicial decisions have been based on the existence of an
independent government allowed to govern its own activities.'77
Because of this uniqueness, a decision on one subject, such as gam-
bling, has a substantial impact on decisions in other important areas of
Indian law' involving the issue of sovereignty.
2. Federal Policy Is Being Ignored
By reducing the strength of the presumption in favor of the tribes,
the courts have not effectively implemented federal policy. At the
heart of the federal government's policy is its drive to make the Indian
tribes self-governing and self-sufficient.' 78 The paradox is that as fed-
173. Cabazon, 107 S. Ct. at 1095.
174. Sec, e.g., Ramah Navajo School Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832, 845 (1982);
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 144, 150 (1980); see also Barsh, supra
note 36, at 867. But see Colville, 447 U.S. 134 (1980) (state taxation of reservation sales to non-
Indians allowed although it apparently served no regulatory purpose and may have deprived the
tribe of badly needed revenues).
175. See Barsh, supra note 36, at 867-68.
176. The Justices rationalize their approach as the "particularization" of their analysis.
White Mfountain Apache Tribe, 448 U.S. at 145; see also Ramah Navajo School Bd., 458 U.S. 832;
Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148 (1973).
177. See supra notes 7-10, 19-20 and accompanying text.
178. For example, current federal policy is illustrated by the Indian Self-Determination and
Education Assistance Act of 1975, 25 U.S.C. § 450 (1982), as well as the Indian Financing Act of
1974, 25 U.S.C §§ 1451-1543 (1982), which states: "It is hereby declared to be the policy of
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eral regulation is reduced, the states are preempted less and less,
enabling them to regulate even more.'7 9 Moreover, to become self-
sufficient the tribes must move into innovative and different fields, a
task which is already difficult enough with most tribes' limited
resources. 8 ° But as they move into new fields, the Indians again
become the target of increased state regulation.'18
Indian tribes are in a difficult position. Unless the courts continue
to enforce the presumption in favor of Indian tribes, the tribes must
accept economic development on the states' terms or risk turning off
potential developers who do not want to face possible obstacles. 82
Lost in the struggle are potential non-Indian developers and investors
who need to know whether state or tribal laws and rules apply to their
activities.'83 This goes against express federal policy. 84 The Indians
must know what they can rely upon in order to formulate the eco-
nomic plans that are essential to any realistic hopes of self-sufficiency.
C The Erosion of Tribal Power
The new approaches to jurisdictional disputes clearly do not protect
the tribes from state intrusion as well as earlier theories of Indian anal-
ysis.'8 5 Though Cabazon does not expand this activity, there is noth-
ing in the opinion to stop it either. Because the Cabazon decision is
very specific to its facts, it is difficult to tell from the opinion whether
or not Indian analysis used previously will be used again.
1. The Supreme Court's Expansion of State Power: Cabazon in
Light of Previous Decisions
Rice v. Rehner 186 is an extreme example of decreasing tribal power
Congress ... to help develop and utilize Indian resources, both physical and human, to a point
where the Indians will fully exercise responsibility for the utilization and management of their
own resources .... 25 U.S.C. § 1451 (1982); accord White Mountain Apache Tribe. 448 U.S. at
143 n.10.
179. For instance, cigarette sales to non-Indians was one area that was almost completely
controlled by the tribes. Federal participation was minimal or absent. Yet. state taxation of the
cigarette sales has been allowed in recent years. See, e.g., Washington v. Confederated Tribes of
Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
180. The majority of the 81 reservations in California, where the Cabazon tribe is located, are
in isolated areas without timber, minerals, fish, or game. Many tribes' only resource is their
"unique legal status as sovereigns." DeDominicis, supra note 100, at 31.
181. See Pelcyger, supra note 27, at 33.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
185. For example, "the wall" and the infringement test both placed Indian interests first. See
Canby, supra note 22.
186. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
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in the last several years. From the Cabazon opinion, it almost appears
that the reliance Rice placed on the vague theory of "traditional"
Indian activity analysis has fallen into disfavor. The Court did not
apply the "traditional" analysis to the facts in Cabazon in any
depth.'87 This is an encouraging sign, since "traditional" analysis is
flawed.188 Major criticisms are that this analysis is overly discretion-
ary, illogical, and that it works against the federal policy of encourag-
ing new economic endeavors for Indians.8 9 However, since the
Cabazon Court did not expressly dismiss "traditional" analysis, this
line of reasoning may turn up again.
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reserva-
tion190 is also difficult to reconcile comfortably with Cabazon. In Col-
ville, the state's interest in taxation was held to be greater than the
tribe's need for revenue since the tribe's income was being generated
by activities in which it did not have a "significant interest." 191 In
contrast, the Indians' revenue-producing interest in Cabazon was held
to be greater than the state's efforts-to curb organized crime simply
because the tribe built modern facilities rather than importing prod-
ucts for resale. 192 This evidently gave the Indians the necessary "sig-
nificant interest" to exempt them from state regulation. Both tribes
catered to non-Indians, however, and both were engaged in important
revenue-producing activities.
The conclusion that emerges from these cases is that the Court
seems to be getting wrapped up in details rather than focusing on the
overall federal policy of building up the Indians' economic base. This
is apparant when the Court is forced to make distinctions such as that
between customers in Colville who only drive in, make a purchase, and
leave,' 93 and those in Cabazon who spend more time on the
reservation. 194
2. The Lack of Predictability in Indian Law
It is difficult to predict with any assurance what the Court will do
next time under slightly different circumstances. A problem in gam-
187. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 107 S. Ct. 1083, 1094 (1987).
188. See, e.g., Barsh, supra note 36, at 873-76; Canby, supra note 22, at 16-19; Note, supra
note 34.
189. See, e.g., Note, supra note 34.
190. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
191. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 155
(1980).
192. Cabazon, 107 S. Ct. at 1093-94.
193. Id. at 1094.
194. Id.
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bling cases, as well as in many Indian law cases, is that the holdings
are extremely fact-specific.' 95 The decision in Cabazon turns on the
fact that gambling is not completely prohibited in California and that
there is no proof yet of organized crime on the Indian reservations.19 6
A change in either one of these facts could have resulted in a different
outcome.
This lack of consistency was noted earlier by Justice Rehnquist,
who stated that a well-defined body of principles is needed to end the
case-by-case litigation which has troubled Indian law for years.' 97
Because of the Court's inconsistency, its Indian law decisions lack
precedential value.'9 8
The Cabazon opinion could be taken as a clear message to the states
that they will not be allowed to interfere in reservation activities. But
the pendulum could just as easily swing back and allow the states to
regulate for a different "court rationalized" reason. 99
D. A Solution
The Supreme Court is faced with a limited number of options in any
effort to arrive on stabler ground. It can either return to one of its
previous tests, formulate a completely new one, make the standards on
a current test more concrete, or defer to the legislature. While the last
two options are the most viable, whatever option is used, the Court
needs to steer toward two goals. First, the regulatory-prohibitory dis-
tinction of PL 280 needs to depend less on the discretion of those
states given jurisdiction under the statute. Second, a balancing test
should not be part of Indian preemption analysis.
The era of "the wall" in Indian law has passed °.2 ° Even a strict
"infringement test," prohibiting state action if Indian interests are
infringed upon in any way, is no longer practical under today's condi-
tions. As the contact between Indians and non-Indians increases, par-
ticularly in the competitive economic field, states are going to cite
social interests more often in attempting to extend their jurisdiction
195. See supra note 176.
196. Cabazon, 107 S. Ct. at 1088-89, 1094-95.
197. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 176
(1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring and dissenting).
198. Pelcyger, supra note 27, at 32.
199. For instance, the courts might use some rationale similar to the theories of "'traditional
activity" in Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713 (1983), or "inconsistency with tribal status" in
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978), to allow state regulation of Indian
activities.
200. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 141 (1980).
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into the affairs of the reservation.2° ' With the dismissal of the older
tests, the courts may have waived the use of a clear-cut, simple
formula on which to base their decisions, but they did not replace
these tests with one that can be relied upon to obtain consistent
results.
1. Standardizing PL 280
In cases involving PL 280, the Court currently decides case by case
whether a statute is regulatory in nature or prohibitory in nature. In
making its decision, the Court could narrow the reach of PL 280 by
using a test that would only allow the application of those state laws
that can be described generally as guarding against acts which are
malum in se, "naturally evil," as adjudged by the sense of a civilized
community.20 2 As a result, arbitrary distinctions as to whether a regu-
lation is more prohibitory or regulatory would be greatly reduced.
The Court could also discontinue the use of the ineffective public pol-
icy test.
Standardizing PL 280 would increase clarity and consistency. This
result would be of enormous help to the tribes in their efforts to attract
investors, make reasonably stable plans for the future, and become
economically independent. These steps would also conform with the
canons of construction in Indian law, which require ambiguous stat-
utes to be construed in favor of the Indians.2 °3
2. A Return to Preemption Analysis Which Emphasizes
Indian Interests
To halt the trend toward increasing state intrusion and the fashion-
ing of judicial decisions to meet the situation, a stricter standard is also
necessary for cases in which PL 280 is not applicable. A refinement of
Indian preemption analysis will implement federal policy by advanc-
ing tribal interests. To achieve this result, states must defer to tribal
interests unless, one, Congress expressly grants state regulatory pow-
ers in a specific area; or two, the state has some extraordinary interest,
201. Lytle, The Supreme Court, Tribal Sovereignty, and Continuing Problems of State
Encroachment into Indian Country, 8 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 65, 77 (1980).
202. State v. Trent, 122 Or. 444, 259 P. 893, 898 (1927); see GETCHES & WILKINSON, supra
note 38, at 546. The reverse of this solution would be to classify a civil statute as regulatory in
nature if it involves any regulation at all. The result would be the same. It would be an easier
test to apply and the majority of state laws would be defined as regulatory laws that cannot be
enforced on Indian reservations.
203. See, eg., Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 392-93 (1976); Alaska Pac. Fisheries Co.
v. United States, 248 U.S. 78, 89 (1918).
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rather than just a "sufficient" interest,2 °4 which justifies an exception
to the usual presumption. There should be no balancing per se of state
interests against Indian and federal interests. Ignoring the importance
of Indian sovereignty as a determining factor in Indian law decisions
has only produced confusion.
The key to the new test would be the recognition by the courts that,
even in the absence of extensive federal regulation, the burden is firmly
placed on the state to prove that state regulation of an Indian activity
is necessary to protect a legitimate, identifiable state interest. A state
would need to specify exactly what state interest is in danger, and how
state intrusion into reservation activities will avert damage to this
interest.
The numerous advantages to refining Indian preemption analysis
include fewer fact-specific decisions and more predictable outcomes.
Recognizing the presumption in favor of the Indians would be in line
with federal goals, and would stop the trend toward an equal weighing
of state and Indian interests with its accompanying intrusion of state
power. This test would also avoid the fundamental conflict caused by
basing a decision on the degree of federal regulation in an area while at
the same time stressing the importance of promoting Indian self-suffi-
ciency and self-government.
The test is simpler to apply, yet it still contains a safety valve. If the
court holds that the state's interest is extraordinary, a state law can be
applied as an exception to the general rule. This state law exception
would be an adequate safeguard when not connected to a balancing
test as an extra means under which to gain state jurisdiction. In the
end, by using this method, the presumption in favor of the Indians
would be preserved.
3. An Answer to the Gambling Dispute: The Indian Gambling
Control Act
The best solution to the conflict over gambling is for Congress to
take action. The Indian Gambling Control Act mutually benefits both
the states and the tribes. The tribes would have definitive standards on
which to rely and the states would have some assurance that safe-
guards against organized crime were being taken. The questions about
express Congressional consent to state jurisdiction over gambling
would be eliminated. Consequently, in accord with federal policy,
204. In Cabazon, the Court noted that state jurisdiction would not be preempted if a state's
interests were "sufficient to justify the assertion of state authority." California v. Cabazon Band
of Mission Indians, 107 S. Ct. 1083, 1092 (1987).
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investors would be more likely to get involved with the tribes since the
issue of state jurisdiction over Indian gambling activities would be
firmly resolved.
Judicial limitations on tribal sovereignty are debatable, but there is
no doubt that Congress has the power to exercise authority over any
Indian activities.2" 5 The federal government's power to regulate
Indian affairs is limited only by the constitutional restraints that are
applicable to all federal statutes.20 6 If it wishes, Congress may com-
pletely preempt the regulatory power of both the states and the tribes.
Congress has made vague noises in the past about formulating a more
specific Indian gambling policy. It is long overdue.
Whether Congress eventually acts or not, the Supreme Court would
stop the trend of increasing state power over Indian tribes by returning
to basics. The end result would be a welcome reduction of the chaos
and confusion caused by the Indian decisions of the 1970's and 1980's.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court failed miserably in California v. Cabazon Band
of Mission Indians to clear up the confusion caused in recent years by
an increasing number of conflicting decisions. The inadequacy of
Cabazon is not in what the Court actually decided, but in what it did
not decide. Tribal interests and the federal policies underlying Indian
activities are not being given the deference they deserve. The elimina-
tion of the current balancing of state interests against Indian interests
would remedy this situation. A stricter standard which strengthens
the presumption in favor of the Indian tribes, and allows for an excep-
tion for extraordinary state interests, should be instituted in its place.
In addition, only statutes which are clearly prohibitory in nature
should be applied to Indian affairs. Congress should also move for-
ward with the proposed Indian Gambling Control Act. These actions
will uphold the tradition of Indian sovereignty against any attacks on
its continued existence.
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